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STUDENT COMMENTS
THE FAMILY NAME DILEMMA: A QUESTION
OF "FAIRNESS"
The common law doctrine of unfair competition does not lend itself to
precise definiton or delimitation. The Supreme Court once characterized
the substance of the wrong as "the sale of the goods of one manufacturer
or vendor for those of another,'" and thereafter most courts continued to
restrict the definition to conduct resulting in such "palming off" or "passing
off."2 In a broader view, however, the recurrent practice of the courts "to
mold, even to expand, the legal remedy in this field to conform to ethical
business practice"3 is indicative of the inherent flexibility of the rules of un-
fair competition. 4 "Fairness," the operative principle of that action, is not a
static concept; 5 rather, it is constantly being recast from the mold of chang-
ing business methods and shifting standards of commercial morality. It is
the purpose of this comment to examine one aspect of unfair competition—
the business use of a surname or family name—which is particularly illus-
trative of the dynamic nature of the "fairness" concept. Before proceeding,
however, the relationship between unfair competition and the law of trade-
marks should first be considered.
I. UNFAIR COMPETITION AND THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS
The substantive law of trademark infringement has traditionally been
described as a branch of the broader law of unfair competition; the essence
of the wrong circumscribed by each action is that the defendant has passed
off his goods as those of the complainant.° At one time, however, courts of
equity drew very sharp distinctions between the two, and, though unfavorably
regarded by some,7 the resulting dichotomy was nevertheless considered to be
fundamental' Moreover, despite the eventual merger of unfair competition
and the law of trademarks, certain facets of this dichotomy persisted in
1 Howe Scale Co. v. Wyckoff, Seamans & Benedict, 198 U.S. 118, 140 (1905).
2 See, e.g., Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 53 F.
Supp. 272, 276 (W.D. Ky. 1943).
3 Prunier v. Prunier's Restaurant, 159 Misc. 551, 554, 288 N.Y. Supp. 529, 532
(Sup. Ct. 1936).
4 "[T]here is no part of the law which is more plastic than unfair competition, and
what was not reckoned an actionable wrong 25 years ago may have become such today."
Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosier Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1925) (per L. Hand, J.).
5 I Aims, Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks at vi (4th ed. 1947).
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916).
7 "It is to be regretted that sharp distinction was ever drawn between that trespass
on property rights called trade-mark infringement, and the exactly similar trespass com-
monly spoken of as unfair competition . • . . 1 ' Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids, 190 Fed.
285, 286-87 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911).
Handler & Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names—An Analysis and Synthesis,
30 Colum. L. Rev. 168 (1930).
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family name cases,g and, as will later appear, that aspect of unfair competi-
tion has remained sui generis. The distinctions were paramount in three
areas: (1) the nature of the right protected, (2) the proof of fraud required,
and (3) the extent of the relief granted."
First, with regard to the nature of the right, protection of a common law
or technical trademark presupposed the infringement of an exclusive right
to the use of a word or mark, 11
 which, because of its uniqueness or fanci-
fulness (e.g., the coined word "Kodak"), could be appropriated to the use
of a particular merchant in the first instance. Such arbitrary words are not
public property in the sense of forming part of the common language, and
thus an exclusive right to their utilization as trademarks could be recog-
nized. The action of unfair competition, on the other hand, is concerned with
the protection of "trade names,"" which incorporate words that are in the
public domain and hence not subject to exclusive appropriation by anyone."
"[W]ords descriptive of qualities or attributes, generic designations, per-
sonal . .. names, geographical terms, and the Iike . ." are examples."
Whereas a broad public right prevails as to this category of words or names
which prevents their "monopolization" as common law trademarks, it might
well be asked why their usage, even as trade names, should be accorded
protection.
The answer lies in the requirement that they first be "lifted from the
public domain,"" i.e., that they acquire an additional or "secondary" mean-
ing, before their use as trade names will be protected under the law of unfair
competition. The concept of secondary meaning evolved from the realization
that strict adherence to the rule denying trademark protection to common
words or names would encourage commercial fraud.
[The theory] contemplates that a word or phrase originally, and in
that sense primarily, incapable of exclusive appropriation ... might
nevertheless have been used so long and so exclusively by one pro-
9 "[M]ore of the traditional differences between the two actions hold true of the
personal name cases than of other non-technical marks." Id. at 196 n.82. This observa-
tion was made despite the authors' general conclusion that the essential unity between
cases involving unfair competition and those based on trademark infringement indicated
that the sharp line between the two actions was being obliterated.
10 See I Nims, op. cit. supra note 5, § 1, at 11-13. See also Handler & Pickett, supra
note 8, at 168-69, citing these and other related distinctions traditionally drawn between
the two actions.
11 National Grocery Co. v. National Stores Corp., 95 N.J. Eq. 588, 592, 123
Atl. 740, 742 (1924).
12 A trade name is any designation which is adopted and used by a person to
denominate goods which he markets, or services which he renders, or a business
which he conducts, or has come to be so used by others, and through its asso-
ciation with such goods, services, or business, has acquired a special significance
as the name thereof.
Edmondson Village Theatre, Inc. v. Einbinder, 208 Md. 38, 45, 116 A.2d 377, 380 (1955).
13 W. R. Lynn Shoe Co. v. Auburn-Lynn Shoe Co., 100 Me. 461, 475, 62 Atl. 499,
505 (1905).
14 B. DiMedi° & Sons v. Camden Lumber & Millwork Co., 23 N.J. Super. 365,
368, 93 A.2d 45, 47 (1952).
19 Standard Oil Co. v. Michie, 34 F.2d 802, 804 (E.D. Mo. 1929).
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ducer with reference to his article that, in that trade and to that
branch of the purchasing public, the word or phrase had come to
mean that the article was his product; in other words, had come to
be, to them, his trade-mark. So it was said that the word had come
to have a secondary meaning . , . . 16 (Emphasis added.)
Thus, the nature of the right to be protected in cases where a common word
or name had acquired secondary meaning was defined by the "new meaning
of the word which the trade-mark use of it . . created. The new meaning
does not belong to the public but only to the concern to which it attaches."12
Consequently, although such words or names were incapable of becoming
technical trademarks, 18 the right to their new or secondary meaning be-
came entitled to protection under the law of unfair competition. 1°
The second distinction between the two actions concerned the necessity
for proof of fraud. In an action for infringement of a trademark, wrongful
or fraudulent intent was always presumed from the mere fact of another's
use of the mark.20 Since a technical trademark's significance was arbitrary
rather than generic or descriptive, it could have only its established meaning,
and thus, any subsequent imitation gave rise to the cause of action regard-
less of motive.21 By contrast, proof of fraudulent intent was regarded as an
essential element of any cause of action based on unfair competition. 22 As a
result, it was held that before competitive use of an established trade name
would be restrained, the complainant had to show such circumstances as
19 G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 Fed. 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1912).
17 1 Nims, op. cit. supra note 5, § 37, at 156.
18 Section 2(e) of the Lanham Act denies federal registration to marks which, when
applied to the applicant's goods, are "merely descriptive" or "primarily geographically
descriptive," or to a mark which is "primarily a surname." 60 Stat. 429 (1946), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052 (1964). Section 2(f), however, does allow trademark registration, under certain
conditions, of words which have become "distinctive of the applicant's goods in com-
merce," thus incorporating the common law principle of secondary meaning. In addition,
the term "trade-mark" is defined in § 45 so as to include both trademarks and common
law trade names; the definition of "trade name" is limited to firm names not used to
identify goods. 60 Stat. 443 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1964).
19 Today, additional protection is afforded the owner of a trade name in those
states (Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York) which have enacted
anti-dilution statutes. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 110, § 7A (1947). Statutes of
this type purport to stop the gradual "whittling away" of the distinctiveness of a mark
through its use by another, even where competition and confusion are lacking. The
Massachusetts statute includes both trademarks and trade names within its protection,
but it also requires that the mark involved have a "distinctive quality" which is threat-
ened. This requirement would seem to exclude "weak" descriptive or suggestive words
or personal names, all of which lack such a quality. See Pickett, Anti-Dilution Litiga-
tion in the United States, 55 Trademark Rep. 785, 793 (1965). Where secondary mean-
ing can be demonstrated, however, the result may be otherwise. In Tiffany & Co. v.
Boston Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 836 (D. Mass. 1964), all use of the mark "Tiffany" by
a restaurant was restrained. Although a personal name, "Tiffany" was considered by the
court to be a "very strong mark" which had acquired a "distinct secondary meaning."
Id. at 842-43.
20 Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Co., 179 U.S. 665, 674 (1901).
21 Id. at 677. See Gulden v. Chance, 182 Fed. 303, 306 (3d Cir. 1910).
22 National Grocery Co. v. National Stores Corp., supra note 11.
321
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
would demonstrate the defendant's "wrongful intent in fact, or justify that
inference from the inevitable consequences of the act complained 0f." 22
Moreover, although this ruling indicates that relief would be granted not
only where the defendant's intent was fraudulent, but also where the effect
of his action, regardless of intent, was to cause public confusion and injury
to the plaintiff, it will later be shown that a requirement of deliberate fraud
was commonly imposed in family name cases. 24
The final distinction between unfair competition and the law of trade-
marks was based on the scope of the relief granted in each action. When
a common law trademark was infringed,25 the injunction restraining sub-
sequent imitation was absolute, and all use of the mark was prohibited. 26
In cases involving unfair competition, on the other hand, the nonexclusive
nature of the first user's right was regarded as necessitating a more limited
type of protection. Consequently, the injunctive relief was qualified in
scope, permitting exercise of the right to use the name or word in its primary
sense, but prohibiting any abuse of that right which could lead to public
confusion.27
 The objective of the courts, therefore, was "to work out a modus
vivendi under which the parties [could' . . . engage in fair competition with
each other . .."25
II. THE USE OF A FAMILY NAME AS CONSTITUTING UNFAIR COMPETITION
A. Early Development
Judicial consideration of the limitations on the right to the business
use of a family name or surname can hardly be termed a recent development
in the law of unfair competition. In fact, it has been suggested that the
action of unfair competition may have had its beginnings in personal name
cases.29
 Typically, the plaintiff in these cases promotes his family name to
the status of a well-known trade name in business. Subsequently, a defendant
with an identical or similar surname enters the same or a related business
23
 Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Co., supra note 20, at 674.
24 
"The rule [that fraud could also be inferred from the effect of the defendant's
action] ... is, however, frequently modified by an equally well-settled principle giving
one the benefit of the use of his own name." Gates v. Gates Coal Co., 114 Pa. Super.
157, 161, 174 Atl. 3, 4 (1934).
25
 "There is infringement if the words or designs used by the defendant are iden-
tical with, or so similar to, the plaintiff's that they are likely to cause confusion."
McGraw-Hill Publishing Co. v. American Aviation Associates, Inc., 117 F.2d 293, 294
(D.C. Cir. 1940).
26 Handler & Pickett, supra note 8, at 169.
27
 Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Co., supra note 20. See Howe Scale Co.
v. Wyckoff, Seamans & Benedict, supra note 1, at 136. The considerations that underlie
unfair competition and the law of trademarks have been described as: the protection
of those who are honest in their business, the punishment of the dishonest dealer, and
protection of the public from deception. Time, Inc. v. Motor Publications, 131 F. Supp.
846, 848-49 (D. Md. 1955). The diversity of opinion as to which of these constitutes
the dominant consideration of the courts is fully examined in 1 Nims, op. cit. supra
note 5, §§ 7-9.
28 John B. Stetson Co. v. Stephen L. Stetson Co., 14 F. Supp. 74, 88 (S.D.N.Y.
1936).
20 Handler & Pickett, supra note 8, at 196 n.82.
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under his own name, causing public confusion and consequent diversion of
the plaintiff's trade. Thereafter, seeking injunctive relief, the plaintiff asserts
a special interest in the name based on priority of use; the defendant contends
that he has a natural right to the business use of his own family name.
Resolution of this apparent conflict of rights must then depend on an appli-
cation of the rules of unfair competition as viewed through the prevailing
concept of "fairness."
The early history of personal name litigation discloses that courts of
equity were guided in their attempts to resolve the family name dilemma by
the so-called "sacred-right" theory, which posited the inherent right of every
man to the use of his own name in his own business. 30 Judicial deference to
this principle was reinforced by the belief that hardship would follow any
denial of that right in an age when business goodwill was developed through
personal contacts, and use of other than a family name invited the reproach
of doing business under "false colors."11 As a result, these cases were decided
in strict conformity to the "fundamental" distinctions thought to exist be-
tween unfair competition and the law of trademarks. Thus, since personal
names were considered generic and, therefore, incapable of exclusive appro-
priation, 82 it was held that every man had the absolute right to the honest
trade use of his own name. 33 Further, since it was believed that no degree
of prior secondary meaning could diminish this right, confusion and injury
resulting from the mere similarity of names were considered nonactionable. 34
The plaintiff, therefore, had the burden of proving that the defendant had
resorted to artifice, or had done some act calculated to deceive the public
as to the identity of his business or the source of his goods. 33 In other words,
to be actionable, confusion and consequent injury to the plaintiff had to re-
sult from the manner in which the defendant used his name, rather than the
mere use itself." Even then, however, complete injunctive relief was denied
in all but a few extraordinary cases where blatant fraud colored the defen-
dant's every use of the name. 37 Absent such aggravated circumstances, the
courts merely qualified the defendant's right to use his own name by prescrib-
ing modifications which they hoped would avoid public confusion and decep-
tion.38
35 "The right of a person to use his family name in his business is regarded as a
natural right, of which he cannot be deprived by reason simply of priority of use by
another of the same name." Higgins v. Higgins Soap Co., 144 N.Y. 462, 467, 39 N.E.
490, 491 (1895).
81 Hat Corp. of America v. D. L. Davis Corp., 4 F. Supp. 613, 623 (D. Conn. 1933).
82 Brown Chem. Co. v. Meyer, 139 U.S. 540, 542 (1891).
33 Meneely v. Meneely, 62 N.Y. 427, 431 (1875), cited with approval in Singer
Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 188 (1896).
34 Brown Chem. Co. v. Meyer, supra note 32, at 544.
35 Meneely v. Meneely, supra note 33, at 431.
38 Harson v. Halkyard, 22 R.I. 102, 104, 46 Atl. 271 (1900).
87 3 Callmann, Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks 1679 (2d ed. 1950). See, e.g.,
Van Stan's Stratena Co. v. Van Stan, 209 Pa. 564, 58 Atl. 1064 (1904), where the defen-
dant was restrained from all use of his name when he simulated the plaintiff's label,
script, container, advertisements, and trade circulars, intending thereby to deceive the
public.
38 See, e.g., the decree modified and affirmed in Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co. v.
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In its initial development, therefore, the family name aspect of unfair
competition was characterized by a strict adherence to the "sacred right"
theory and a narrow interpretation of the requirements of "fairness." As the
law developed, however, it became apparent that honest use of a family name
should neither be the sole criterion of "fairness" nor a complete defense
to an action based on unfair competition when, through prior trademark
use by another, that name had acquired secondary meaning. Where such
meaning was demonstrated, it became obvious that mere use of the name
itself, unaccompanied by other deceptive acts, could result in public con-
fusion. Thus, the new or secondary signification of the name came to be
recognized as the subject of an exclusive right of the prior user," not unlike
that enjoyed by the owner of a technical trademark, and as such, de-
serving of affirmative protection. As a result, the Supreme Court was led to
reevaluate its former conservative views:
[W]hatever generality of expression there may have been in the
earlier cases, it now is established that when the use of his own name
upon his goods by a later competitor will and does lead the public
to understand that those goods are the product of a concern already
established and well-known under that name, and when the profit of
the confusion is known to and, if that be material, is intended by
the later man, the law will require him to take reasonable precau-
tions to prevent the mistake.4°
The Court, however, failed to resolve the issue concerning the necessity for
proof of fraud in family name cases based on unfair competition. Moreover,
there was no delimitation of the extent of relief which should be granted
to prevent mistakes resulting from public confusion. Although both of these
questions would appear to be foreclosed by recognition of the exclusive nature
of a prior user's right to the secondary meaning of his personal trade name,
their resolution has been hampered by many difficulties, some of which are
still apparent today.
B. Present Status
The family name cases have been divided as to whether the injurious
effect of the defendant's use of his own name, or the fraudulent intent with
which he used it, should be of paramount concern 41
 In the early development
of unfair competition, liberal courts favored the former criterion, and enlarged
the concept of "fraud" to include any activity resulting in public confusion
and deception.42 Significantly, application of this view to personal name cases
Hall's Safe Co., 208 U.S. 554, 560 (1908), which prohibited the use of the name Hall,
"either alone or in combination . . . unless accompanied by information that the de-
fendant is not the original Hall's Safe and Lock Company . . . or, as the case may
be, that the article is not the product of the last named company or its successors."
3° Chickering v. Chickering & Sons, 215 Fed. 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1914).
40 L. E. Waterman Co. v. Modern Pen Co., 235 U.S. 88, 94 (1914).
41 3 Callmann, op. cit. supra note 37, at 1722. For a relatively recent case noting
this difference of opinion, see Edmondson Village Theatre, Inc. v. Einbinder, supra
note 12, at 45-46, 116 A.2d at 380-81.




was restrained by strong judicial adherence to the principles of the "sacred
right" theory." However, with the later realization that the mere applica-
tion of a recognized name to the product or business of a competitor could
cause confusion, it was accepted that "a willful intent to injure another or
purposely to take advantage of an established business reputation need not
be present . . . )744
Two recent cases, MacSweeney Enterprises, Inc. v. Tarantino" and
David B. Findlay, Inc. V. Findlay," are illustrative of the present shift of
emphasis in family name cases from fraudulent intent to the deceptive effect
of the defendant's act, i.e., the objective infringement. The plaintiff in
MacSweeney, the operator of the famous restaurant in San Francisco known
as "Tarantino's," sought to enjoin the defendants from using that name in
their restaurant business at Al Tahoe, California. The California District
Court of Appeals expressly rejected the lower court's holding that confusion
was irrelevant in the absence of fraud, and adopted the rule that
the original user of a trade name whose exploitation of that name
has given to its use a "secondary" meaning is entitled to enjoin use
by a junior appropriator (even though the trade name be the lat-
ter's surname) when and to .the extent that deception is likely.
Actual fraud, i.e., planning or contrivance, by the junior user is
not necessary. 47 (Emphasis added.)
The decision in the Findlay case is in sharp contrast to the unequivocal
principles of the "sacred right" theory earlier espoused in that jurisdiction. 48
The parties involved were brothers, both of whom had been separately en-
gaged in the art business in different states for over twenty-five years. In
1963, the defendant purchased the premises immediately adjacent to his
brother's business on East 57th Street in New York City and opened an
art gallery under the name "Wally Findlay Galleries." Public confusion
resulted, and the plaintiff immediately sought to enjoin his brother's use of
the family name. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's
order enjoining the defendant's use of the name "Findlay" on 57th Street,
despite a finding that he had not deliberately set out to exploit his brother's
goodwill. Concluding that the "sacred right" theory was not unlimited,
the majority noted that a trade name with a secondary meaning was in-
volved, and that fraud or deliberate intent to mislead the public was not a
necessary element where confusion was present or threatened:
43 See note 24 supra.
44 Madison v. LaSene, 44 Wash. 2d 546, 555, 268 P.2d 1006, 1011 (1954). It is note-
worthy that dicta in some early Supreme Court cases indicated that where a personal
name had acquired secondary meaning, the use of such name by another without precau-
tion could, in itself, amount to an artifice calculated to produce deception. Herring-Hall-
Marvin Safe Co. v. Hall's Safe Co,, supra note 38, at 599; Singer Mfg. Co. v. June
Mfg. Co., supra note 33, at 188.
45 235 Cal. App. 2d 549, 45 Cal. Rptr. 546 (1965).
46 18 N.Y.2d 12, 218 N.E.2d 531, 271 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1966).
47 235 Cal. App. at 561, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
48 Meneely v. Meneely, supra note 33.
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The bona fides of [defendant's] . . . intentions do not change the
applicable principles. The objective facts of this unfair competition
and injury to plaintiff's business are determinative, not the defen-
dant's subjective state of mind."
The dissenters ignored the concept of secondary meaning and, in effect, ar-
gued for the continued validity of the "sacred right" theory. Since there was
no evidence of wrongful or fraudulent intent, they concluded that the con-
fusion resulting from the defendant's good-faith use of his own name was
not actionable."
MacSweeney and Findlay are indicative of the present status of the
fraud requirement in family name cases, and the rule they articulate is both
logical in formulation and just in result. Since the plaintiff is injured as the
result of confusion regardless of motive or intent, it is unreasonable to con-
clude that the defendant's subjective state of mind should be the determina-
tive factor.51
 The right to use one's name because of its generic signification
should not imply a right to appropriate goodwill belonging to another. 52
Therefore, since one of the general objectives of equity courts in unfair com-
petition cases is to protect the goodwill of the complainant, "fairness"
requires that the sole criterion should be an objective one—namely, the pres-
ence or likelihood of confusion. And, as one writer has noted, where a per-
sonal name has acquired secondary meaning and a competitor uses the same
name, "to do so cannot but create confusion."53
The question of the extent of relief to be accorded the prior user of
a family trade name has not, unlike the issue of fraud, been completely re-
solved even today. As previously noted, the belief that no man could be
denied the right to use his name, simply because of its prior use by another,
led to the conclusion that the court's power should properly be directed
toward the correction of any abuse of that right rather than its preclusion.
The latecomer, therefore, was free to use his own name even where it had
previously acquired secondary meaning, as long as he took reasonable pre-
cautions to prevent public deception. It was carefully emphasized, however,
that
this duty to warn ... must not be pressed so far as to make it im-
practicable for the second corner to use his name in trade. Otherwise
we destroy under the law of unfair trade competition the very right
which we have saved under the law of trade-mark. 54
Because of this judicial reluctance to prohibit all trade use of a family name,
even where confusion had resulted, injunctive relief was limited to a require-
ment that the defendant either prefix his first name or initials to his surname,
43 18 N.Y.2d at —, 218 N.E.2d at 535, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
53
 Id. at —, 218 N.E.2d at 535-36, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 657-58.
51
 King Pharr Canning Operations, Inc. v. Pharr Canning Co., 85 F. Supp. 150,
154 (W.D. Ark. 1949).
52 J .
 A. Dougherty's Sons v. Dougherty, 36 F. Supp. 149, 151 (ED. Pa. 1940).
53
 1 Nims, Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks § 72, at 219 (4th ed. 1947).
54




or add a phrase disclaiming any connection with the plaintiff's product or
business. However, since the principal cause of confusion was usually the
common family name used by both parties, this method of relief often proved
ineffective,55 and its value has been seriously questioned."
Most critics have now taken the position that, in general, nothing short
of total prohibition of junior usage will prove satisfactory. Nims, for ex-
ample, favors a rule providing that "if the defendant cannot use his name
without confusion resulting, then he may not use it at all in the particular
line of business in which the public has come to associate this name with
the pIaintiff."57 Other writers have found an implicit refutation of the "sacred
right" theory within the concept of secondary meaning itself: Callmann,
although affirming the right of every man to appear under his own name
when he does so as an individual personality, would deny such a right when
the prior user of that name has already made it famous by association with
his product and goodwill. He maintains that if a competitor uses the same
name under the latter circumstances, "it is . . . not the sacred right to his
own name that he exercises; he is attempting to capitalize upon the secondary
meaning name-mark of another, which happens to be identical to his own
name . . . . "58 Hence, Callmann would agree that complete prohibition is
necessary where any competitive usage of an established personal trade name
would inevitably confuse the original association formed in the public mind. 59
Despite severe academic criticism, judicial reluctance to extend com-
plete protection to the senior user of a family name continues to dominate
this aspect of unfair competition." Two types of cases, however, must be
distinguished: first, the cases in which a family trade name is used to identify
the business directly, through its attachment to the physical structure itself
in the manner of a sign (e.g., "Findlay's Art Gallery"); and second, the
cases in which the name is also affixed to the merchant's goods in the manner
55 See, e.g., the summary of the widespread litigation resulting from the Rogers
Silverware and Baker Chocolate cases in 1 Nims, op. cit. supra note 53, § 70.
06 As one federal court observed:
L'Ilhe eye of the purchaser, long taught to identify the product by the name
Dobbs alone, promptly registers the identity as complete upon catching the sur-
name without noticing and pondering the significance of initials or suffix. And
even the occasional purchaser who notices the suffix is not enlightened. For one
who has known of one Dobbs only suddenly confronted with the suggestion
that there are in existence varieties of the species, is not informed which Dobbs
is "his" Dobbs. Confusion is created by the very explanation intended to avert
confusion. (Emphasis added.)
Hat Corp. of America v. D. L. Davis Corp., supra note 31, at 622.
57 1 Nims, op. cit. supra note 53, § 69, at 200.
58 3 Callmann, op. cit. supra note 37, at 1706-07.
59 In the competitive struggle between the two, the public will inevitably be
induced to believe that the later name has reference to the original trade-
mark owner. Indeed it is apparent that the public reaction to the original mark
demonstrates its secondary meaning which is of inestimable value in and of itself.
Id. at 1706.
91) "Courts are naturally reluctant wholly to forbid a man to do business in his
own name and have generally refused to do so." S. M. Spencer Mfg. Co. v. Spencer, 319
Mass. 331, 337, 66 N.E.2d 19, 22 (1946). See Paul Sachs Originals Co. v. Sachs, 325 F.2d
212, 216 n.6 (9th Cir. 1963).
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of a trademark, thus indirectly identifying his business as the source of
those goods (e.g., a "Waterman pen").
When a family trade name is used in a "service" business like a res-
taurant, or by a concern which sells goods produced or manufactured by
another, the secondary meaning attaching to that trade name will ordinarily
enjoy only local popularity because of the fixed situs of the business itself.
Consequently, the geographical area in which any competitive use of the
same name might result in confusion is similarly limited." In such a situa-
tion, courts will issue an injunction prohibiting all junior use of the trade
name in the specific area where it has acquired secondary meaning. In Find-
lay, for example, the injunction restrained the defendant "from using the
name or names 'Wally Findlay Galleries,' `Findlay Galleries' or any other
style or designation incorporating the name 'Findlay' in connection with
the operation of [a] . . . gallery on East 57th Street."62 (Emphasis added.)
It is significant that in cases like Findlay, adequate relief is possible within
the limits defined by established judicial reluctance to deny all use of a family
name. Even the geographically-limited injunction, however, is often rejected
in favor of prefixes or explanatory phrases if the court persists in the belief
that it is possible to protect the plaintiff and at the same time, preserve the
defendant's right to use his name."
When a family trade name is also used to identify the business source
indirectly, through its affixation to goods made or sold by that concern in
its own name, secondary meaning is not usually confined to the immediate
location of the business entity, but is as widespread as the geographical dis-
tribution of those goods. Consequently, the possibility of confusion arises
well beyond their geographical origin." In this circumstance, a personal
01 This geographically-Iimited form of confusion is proscribed by § 2(a) (3) of the
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 9 U.L.A. 183 (Supp. 1965), which concerns com-
mercial conduct causing "likelihood of confusion ... as to affiliation, connection, or asso-
ciation with, or certification by another . ." The comment indicates that this subsec-
tion involves likelihood of confusion caused by misleading "trade names." Like the
Lanham Act, the definition of trade name in § 1(8) of the Uniform Act is limited
to firm names which are not used to identify goods. See discussion note 18 supra. Thus,
any mark which is used to distinguish a person's goods falls under the definition of
"trademark" in § 1(7) of the act, even though it may constitute a common law trade
name.
62 David B. Findlay, Inc. v. Findlay, 47 Misc. 2d 649, 658, 262 N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1017
(1966). Compare Visser v. Macres, 214 Cal. App. 2d 249, 29 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1963), en-
joining use of the name "Macres Florist" in connection with any florist business in the
City of Anaheim; Stern Furniture Co. v. Stern, 52 Ohio L. Abs. 527, 83 N.E.2d 804
(Ct. App, 1948), enjoining defendant's use of his name in connection with a furniture busi-
ness in the "Broadway Business District," where plaintiff's store was located.
61 See, e.g., S. M. Spencer Mfg. Co. v. Spencer, supra note 60. In MacSweeney
Enterprises, Inc. v. Tarantino, supra note 45, the California District Court of Appeals
remanded the case to the trial court for determination of the proper form of injunctive
relief. The final order required the defendant to prefix his first name when using the
common surname "Tarantino." MacSweeney Enterprises, Inc. v. Tarantino, No, 10866,
Super. Ct. Calif., Nov. 5, 1965.
04 The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act also encompasses confusion arising
in this context. Subsection 2(a)(2) prohibits conduct causing "likelihood of confusion
or of misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods
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trade name performs the same function as a technical trademark, and in-
junctive relief against infringement should be framed accordingly. Here,
the absolute but locally-qualified injunction cannot effectively be utilized.
The choice is "between depriving the defendant of his use of his own name .
in connection with the sale of the particular . . . articles on which the plain-
tiff has used the name [or] . . . permitting a condition to continue in which
fraud [i.e., confusion] is inevitable."65 In general, however, the courts have
continued to elect the latter alternative, rather than prohibit all competitive
use of an established family trade name." Moreover, in the few cases where
all use of a surname in a particular field has been enjoined—ostensibly on
the ground that confusion was inevitable—the defendant's use of that name
has been marked by actual fraudulent intent.67
Thus, where no aggravated circumstances are present, courts continue
to regard good faith as a mitigating factor and rely, for the most part, on
qualified injunctive relief. As previously noted, however, good faith is irrele-
vant to the issue of confusion, and the utilization of prefixes or explanatory
phrases has often added to the very confusion which first caused the plaintiff
injury. Realistically,
such results cannot be justified by a false tenderness for the rights
of the individual. To be sure, he is entitled to protection in all
proper use of his name, but not to a use which, though true to the
few fully informed, is false to the many who are only partially in-
formed."
Perhaps a latent factor underlying continued judicial reluctance to grant
adequate relief in family name cases is the possibility of constitutional ob-
jection to any prohibition of a man's right to use his own name. 09 In the
past, courts have anticipated such objections by observing that injunctive
restraint goes to the abuse of the right rather than its denial, and hence,
that such decrees could not properly be deemed deprivations of rights. 70
This reasoning permits adequate relief to be granted where a personal trade
name enjoys only local popularity, because the geographically-limited injunc-
tion constitutes only a qualified denial of the defendant's right to use his
name. The same reasoning, however, is equally adaptable to the situation
where the trade name is more widely known because of its attachment to
the plaintiff's goods. Here again, adequate relief does not necessitate a
complete denial of the defendant's trade rights in his name:
or services." This subsection thus circumscribes conduct traditionally known as "pass-
ing off."
as 1 Nims, op. cit. supra note 53, § 72, at 225.
66 See note 60 supra.
67 See, e.g., Max Factor & Co. v. Factor, 226 F. Supp. 120 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
68 Hat Corp. of America v. D. L. Davis Corp., supra note 31, at 622.
69 One court has declared that "the right of a man to use his own name in his own
business is part of the natural and inalienable rights guaranteed by the very first clause
of our Constitution, without which the right to acquire, possess, and protect property
would be of little worth." Hilton v. Hilton, 89 N.J. Eq. 182, 183-84, 104 AU. 375, 376
(1918).
70 See, e.g., J. A. Dougherty's Sons v. Dougherty, supra note 52.
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The vital part . . . of any decree restricting or forbidding the
use of surnames in business names is that they do not forbid or
limit defendant from use of his name except in connection with the
trade or business in which he has misused it. If this can be under-
stood, much of the hesitation to give relief in surname cases that is
adequate and practical should cease. 71
 (Emphasis added.)
Therefore, unless a defendant can show some special interest in, or necessity
for using an established family trade name which can be weighed in the
balance of "fairness," it seems much the better policy to protect the public
and the plaintiff by effectively eliminating confusion rather than to continue
or compound it because of "false tenderness" for the rights of the latecomer.
Especially in the current age of nonpersonal trade names, when limitations
on the right to use one's name involve no real hardship, "good will estab-
lished through effort and labor should be deserving of more consideration
than the fact that the business name of a competitor happens to be identical
with his family name."72
III. CONCLUSION
In recent years, the doctrine of unfair competition "has evolved into
something different from its more primitive and less ethical forna." 78 As
has been demonstrated, the conservative principles which initially governed
the use of family names in business have been no exception to this evolu-
tionary process. Here, however, the change has been more subtle, and per-
haps less complete, than in other aspects of unfair competition. For a time,
judicial deference to the "sacred right" theory tended to obscure the cor-
relative obligations attaching to the right to the business use of one's name.
As a result, the requirements of "fairness" were narrowly defined, and the
relief granted was of doubtful efficacy.
Today, the basic principle remains unchanged: every man has the right
to the business use of his own name. Now, however, that right is qualified
by increased emphasis on priority and on the protection of established good-
will. Consequently, if a family name acquires secondary signification as a
trade name through the efforts of a prior user, an exclusive right to that
secondary meaning will be recognized. Further, objective infringement, i.e.,
confusion or its likelihood, will be determinative in the event of any subse-
quent use by another, and the scope of protection accorded will be defined
by the circumstances of the particular case. "Fairness" requires at least this,
and given the proper facts, it may and should require more. The operative
consideration should always be the desirability of avoiding confusion. Therein
lies the limit of the plaintiff's right, the measure of the defendant's obligation,
and the breadth of the protection which equity ought to extend.
FREDERICK S. LENZ, JR.
71 1 Nims, op. cit. supra note 53, § 72, at 221.
72 3 Callmann, op. cit. supra note 37, at 1706.
73 Guild & Landis, Inc. v. Liles & Landis Liquidators, Inc., 2 Ohio Misc. 169, 173,
207 N.E.2d 798, 801 (Montgomery County C.P. 1959).
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